A contractual clause excluding from insurance coverage a driver who was under the influence of alcohol, included in a voluntary motor insurance contract for the driver’s personal accident, is invalid and impermissible under Articles 33(1) and 7(5) of Law 2496/1997.
The Supreme Court (Areios Pagos) held as invalid the contractual clause limiting the insurer’s liability, contained in a voluntary motor insurance policy for the driver’s personal accident, which excluded insurance coverage in cases where the insured driver was, at the time the risk materialized, under the influence of alcohol (Supreme Court Decision 181/2022).
According to the reasoning of the Supreme Court, all provisions of Insurance Law 2496/1997 constitute rules of “semi-mandatory” law, meaning that, unless otherwise expressly provided by the statute, the rights of the policyholder may not be restricted by the insurance contract but may only be expanded. Exceptions to this rule—namely, to the semi-mandatory nature of the provisions of insurance law—concern insurance coverage of risks arising from the professional activity of the insured or the policyholder, as well as insurance contracts relating to the carriage of goods, credit or guarantee insurance, and marine or aviation damage insurance, which are by definition commercial insurances and are exhaustively listed in the law.
In the present case, the Court held that the clause excluding insurance coverage due to driving under the influence of alcohol, contained in the multi-risk insurance policy concluded between the appellant anonymous insurance company and the legal predecessor of the plaintiffs–respondents, was invalid. This is because it concerned the additional insurance for the personal accident of the driver of the insured motorcycle, concluded together with that policy and governed by the provisions of Law 2496/1997 pursuant to Article 33 thereof. Through this clause, a restriction was imposed on the rights arising from the personal accident insurance granted under the disputed contract, affecting the insured and the policyholder plaintiffs, who were not acting for professional purposes in relation to the insurance.
Accordingly, having found that the claim in question did indeed arise from the additional personal accident insurance, which was concluded under the same insurance policy by which the insured motorcycle’s civil liability toward third parties had been covered pursuant to Law 489/1976, the Supreme Court rejected the relevant ground of cassation and upheld the judgment of the appellate court.
