The Single-Member Court of First Instance (MPrileias 139/2021) dismissed as unfounded the appeal of the Single Social Security Agency as the quasi-universal successor to the Social Security Institution. The appellant, arguing that, for the benefits due for partial disability as a result of an injury sustained by its insured person in a traffic accident, it was subrogated by law to the latter's claim for compensation against the party that caused the injury, requested the payment of partial disability, main and supplementary pension benefits on behalf of the liable party. According to the provisions of Article 10(5) of Legislative Decree 4104/1960, as replaced by Article 18(1) of Law 4476/1965 and Article 18 of Legislative Decree 1654/1986, it follows that IKA, for insurance benefits owed to insured persons who are entitled to compensation for damage caused to them due to illness, disability or, as in this case, injury, is subrogated by law to the amount of insurance benefits owed to the injured party in the latter's claim against the injuring party. This subrogation occurs by operation of law and dates back to the time when the damage occurred. With regard to the issue of extending the limitation period for the appellant's claims, the court ruled that, since the damage suffered by the victim was foreseeable in the normal course of events from the outset, the appellant's claim for compensation for all damages, actual and consequential, present or future, arose as soon as the damaging event, i.e. the accident and injury, occurred. In particular, the court found that the insured's state of health due to the accident and his resulting inability to work during the period in question was foreseeable from the outset in the normal course of events. No evidence was presented, nor did the appellant claim, that, apart from the insured person's initial serious injury, there were any further complications with his health that constituted an unexpected development of the situation and justified a new limitation period starting from the time when the consequences in question appeared. It pointed out that the decisions of the Director of the Social Security Institution, which extended the insured person's ordinary and partial disability pension due to the accident in question for the period in question, are relevant for determining the final amount of the claim transferred to the appellant by the injured insured person and do not constitute a condition for the origin of the appellant's claim in the first place. The opposite view, according to which the origin of the appellant's claim for compensation against the liable party depends on the issuance of a decision by the competent body of the Social Security Institution (IKA), would be contrary to Article 18 of Law 1456/1986, which links the transfer of the injured party's claim for compensation to the origin of the claim, and would also postpone the start of the limitation period, linking it to an act (the issuance of an act by the competent body of the Social Security Institution) that falls within the sphere of influence of the creditor itself, with the result that, in essence, the limitation period is extended to the detriment of the debtor.

According to the provisions of the Civil Code, it follows that owners of horizontal properties are allowed to regulate the use of the common areas and common property of the co-ownership and to determine the percentage of each horizontal property's share in the common expenses thereof, even if there are regulations governing these, provided that the relevant decision is taken unanimously by the co-owners.

In disputes arising from traffic accidents, a frequently requested and financially significant claim is the claim for compensation for improved nutrition. This claim falls within the conceptual content of medical expenses, i.e., the expenses that were or will be necessary in the future for the salvation and restoration of the victim's health, regardless of whether the latter actually incurred them. is included in the petition of most related lawsuits, but in order for it to be adjudicated, detailed information and data must be presented to substantiate it, and certain conditions must be met.

When it comes to correcting an initial registration marked "unknown owner" and the beneficiary invokes adverse possession as the title of acquisition, the beneficiary's lawsuit is directed against the Greek State. According to the provisions in force regarding the operation of the land registry, in the case of an inaccurate initial registration, an action may be brought before the competent court in terms of subject matter and location, seeking the recognition of the right infringed by the inaccurate registration and the correction, in whole or in part, of the initial registration. The action may be either declaratory or assertive and may be brought by any person with a legal interest, within an exclusive period of five (5) years from the publication of the decision of the Land Registry Agency in the Government Gazette. By way of exception, in the case of a correction of an initial registration marked "unknown owner" and where the beneficiary invokes adverse possession as a title of acquisition, the action is brought against the Greek State, which is considered to be the owner of the properties marked "UNKNOWN OWNER" as soon as the first document becomes final. In particular, in a case examined by the Single-Member Court of First Instance of Larissa, in a lawsuit against the Greek State, the plaintiff, who was the owner of an apartment listed in the land registry as "unknown owner," sought recognition of his ownership, which arose from extraordinary adverse possession of 20 years or more. Specifically, he resided in this property without a regular contract, but only with a preliminary sales agreement, and since then he has exercised acts of ownership and possession, with the intention of being the owner, for a period of more than 20 years, without ever being disturbed by anyone. He claimed that, due to an oversight, when registering the property in the relevant book of the Land Registry Office of L., the property in question was registered as "owner unknown," and he requested in the lawsuit under consideration a) recognition that he is the owner of the disputed property and b) that the first registration of the disputed apartment with the indication "unknown owner" be corrected so that the plaintiff is listed as the owner, with his title of acquisition being extraordinary adverse possession. The court examined the admissibility of the claims in the lawsuit, noting that a summary of the lawsuit had been duly registered in the land registry of the competent Land Registry Office in L. but did not consider it necessary to produce an ENFIA certificate (Law 4223/2013), since, in its opinion, the provision establishing the inadmissibility of the lawsuit if the ENFIA certificate is not produced by the litigant violates and is in direct conflict with the provision of Article 6(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and the provisions of Articles 17, 20, and 25 of the Constitution (property rights, the right to legal protection, and the principle of proportionality), on the grounds that it is not possible for a purely tax provision, which does not concern the protection of parties to real estate transactions or seek to provide judicial protection, to constitute a specific procedural requirement for a real action and a prerequisite for a decision on the merits to be issued, since the objective of the proceedings must always be to issue a decision on the merits and the procedural requirements must be intended to ensure the smooth and unimpeded flow of the proceedings and to guarantee a correct judicial decision. The Court rejected the State's objection that the property had become its property "as an unknown owner," since, according to Article 4(b) of Law 3127/2003, in settlements that existed prior to 1923, adverse possession against the State is possible, provided that, until the entry into force of this law, i.e. until 2003, the beneficiary had been in undisturbed possession of the property for 10 years and had legal title himself or through his assignors. Thus, the action was upheld and a) the plaintiff's right of ownership of the disputed apartment was recognized, and b) the correction of the first entry in the relevant Land Registry Sheet of the relevant Land Registry Office was ordered and the plaintiff was registered as the owner of the apartment.

Driving without a license is a very serious offense with both administrative (traffic fines) and criminal penalties, and in the event of an accident, the insurance company is obliged to compensate any third party who has suffered damage caused by a driver without a license. Therefore, the victim of a traffic accident always receives the compensation they are entitled to from the insurance company. However, the insurance company may then take action against the driver and the owner of the vehicle, claiming back any amount it has paid to the third party. The liability of a driver without a license is therefore unlimited. The owner of the vehicle is also liable. Specifically: According to the provisions of Article 4 of Law GPN/1911, "for any damage caused to third parties by the operation of the vehicle, the driver and the owner, as defined in Article 2, are liable for compensation, and the owner in this case is another person, or the owner is liable only up to the value of the car, which he may, at the discretion of the court, transfer to the injured party and be exempt from any other compensation...". It follows from the above provision that, because the liability of the owner of the vehicle causing the damage is established regardless of whether he is the driver or owner of the vehicle at the time of the accident (objective liability), in order to mitigate the severity of the objective liability of the owner, who is not the keeper or driver, the law limits his liability to the value of the vehicle causing the damage immediately prior to the accident. This limitation of liability takes the form of an objection based on the fact that the owner of the car is not also its keeper or driver.

According to the provisions of Articles 592 and 594 of the Civil Code, respectively "The lessee is not liable for damage or changes due to the agreed use" and "The lessor has the right to immediately terminate the lease and at the same time claim compensation if the lessee, despite the lessor's protests, does not treat the leased property with care and as agreed or does not behave appropriately towards other tenants." The agreed use is determined by the interpretation of the contract (Civil Code 173, 200, 281, 288). Any arbitrary change constitutes misuse, regardless of whether or not it results in the deterioration of the leased property. If the lessee fails to fulfill their obligation to make good use of the leased property, i.e., misuses it, the lessor may exercise their legal rights against the lessee. In particular, they are entitled to: 1) demand proper and appropriate fulfillment, i.e., cessation and omission in the future, 2) terminate the lease immediately, without notice, if, despite his protests, the lessee continues to misuse the leased property, and 3) to claim compensation regardless of whether or not he has exercised his right of termination. A prerequisite for termination is the prior complaint of the lessor and not necessarily multiple successive complaints. With regard to the question of whether the construction of unauthorized buildings constitutes misuse, the Supreme Court ruled in its decision No. 739/2008 that: "negligent treatment of the leased property constitutes both the destruction of parts, components, or accessories of the leased property, as well as any damage to them or any unauthorized intervention by the lessee, without the consent of the lessor, intervention by the lessee, as a result of which the general and specific configuration, layout, and appearance of the leased property, which have been created and intended by the lessor to serve his economic purpose, are substantially altered. According to the provisions of Articles 587 and 599 of the Civil Code, termination of the lease for misuse of the leased property results in the termination of the contract for the future and the obligation of the lessee to return the leased property to the lessor. Consequently, the construction of unauthorized buildings also constitutes misuse of the leased property, and the lessor may terminate the lease and claim compensation or fulfillment of the contract.

According to decision no. 1815/2019 of the Athens Court of First Instance, it was ruled that the partner of a deceased person with whom he was in a free union and had children is entitled to receive reasonable financial compensation for emotional distress under Article 932(c) of the Civil Code. 1. WHO IS COVERED BY THE TERM "FAMILY" As pointed out in detail in the decision, the above provision of the Civil Code aims to protect not only persons who are closely related to the deceased in a traffic accident in accordance with the provisions of Family Law (spouse in a religious or civil marriage, children, siblings, parents, etc.), but also those whose psyche is equally emotionally affected by the loss of their loved one. This category of persons also includes the partner of the deceased if they lived together in a free union and had children. Moreover, based on contemporary social perceptions, the traditional concept of married cohabitation no longer seems to be the exclusive form of family formation, while new forms of family have undoubtedly been created with equally strong emotional ties without the legal framework that was previously necessary. RELEVANT DECISION OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE The European Court of Human Rights, in its judgments in Saucedo Gomez v. Spain (1999) and Korosidou v. Greece (2011), recognized that the cohabitation of two persons for a long period of time without marriage constitutes "family life" within the meaning and with the increased value expressly attributed to it by the European Convention on Human Rights. In any case, of course, the existence of a strong or weak emotional bond with the deceased is a real issue and is judged on a case-by-case basis by the court. The "innovation" of this particular decision is the broadening of the circle of persons belonging to the term "family." The court has the power to decide that, in addition to the closest relatives of the deceased, other persons connected by feelings of love, strong friendship, and affection with the deceased, regardless of whether they lived with him or not. The establishment of a right to compensation for persons other than the close relatives of the victim makes the judge's work more difficult and, in any case, exacerbates the dispute between persons claiming "monetary satisfaction for mental anguish," since the more persons establish such a claim, the smaller the amount that will ultimately be awarded to each of them. CONCLUSION We could conclude, in conclusion, that the criteria that the judge must take into account in combination when deciding on the inclusion of a person who is not related to the deceased by any of the traditional forms of kinship provided for in the Civil Code are the duration of the relationship between the deceased with the person seeking financial compensation, cohabitation, the birth of children, and any other fact which, in the judge's opinion, is capable of linking the beneficiary of financial compensation and the victim with strong feelings of love and trust.

According to the law, the partner of a deceased person with whom they were in a free union and had children is entitled to receive reasonable financial compensation for emotional distress under Article 932(c) of the Civil Code (Decision 1815/2019 MPA). As pointed out in detail in the decision, the above provision of the Civil Code aims to protect not only persons who are closely related to the deceased in a traffic accident in accordance with the provisions of Family Law (spouse in a religious or civil marriage, children, siblings, parents, etc.), but also those whose psyche is equally emotionally affected by the loss of their loved one. This category of persons also includes the partner of the deceased if they lived together in a free union and had children. Moreover, based on contemporary social perceptions, the traditional concept of married cohabitation no longer seems to be the exclusive form of family formation, while new forms of family have undoubtedly been created with equally strong emotional ties without the legal framework that was previously necessary. A direct consequence of the above social change is the tendency of Greek lawmakers in recent years to move away from the narrow conservative assumption that families can only be formed through religious or civil marriage, following the example of other European countries. in recent years to definitively move away from the narrow conservative assumption that a family can only be formed through religious or civil marriage, following the example of almost all European legal systems. Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights has also ruled in the cases of Saucedo Gomez v. Spain (1999) and Korosidou v. Greece (2011), in which it recognised that the cohabitation of two persons for a long period of time without marriage means the existence of 'family life' within the meaning and with the increased value expressly attributed to it by the European Convention on Human Rights. In any case, of course, the existence of a strong or weak emotional bond with the deceased is a real issue and is juSo, "innovation" is basically expanding the circle of people who are part of the family. The court has the power to decide that, in addition to the closest relatives of the deceased, other persons connected by feelings of love, strong friendship, and affection with the deceased, regardless of whether they lived with him or not. Establishing the right to compensation for persons other than the victim's close relatives makes the judge's job more difficult and, in any case, exacerbates the dispute between persons claiming "monetary satisfaction for mental anguish," since the more persons establish such a claim, the smaller the amount that will ultimately be awarded to each of them. In conclusion, the criteria that the judge must take into account in combination when deciding on the inclusion of a person who is not related to the deceased by any of the traditional forms of kinship provided for in the Civil Code are the duration of the relationship the deceased with the person claiming financial compensation, cohabitation, the birth of children, and any other fact which, in the judge's opinion, is capable of linking the beneficiary of financial compensation and the victim with strong feelings of love and trust.dged on a case-by-case basis by the court.

A contractual clause excluding from insurance coverage a driver who was under the influence of alcohol, included in a voluntary motor insurance contract for the driver’s personal accident, is invalid and impermissible under Articles 33(1) and 7(5) of Law 2496/1997. The Supreme Court (Areios Pagos) held as invalid the contractual clause limiting the insurer’s liability, contained in a voluntary motor insurance policy for the driver’s personal accident, which excluded insurance coverage in cases where the insured driver was, at the time the risk materialized, under the influence of alcohol (Supreme Court Decision 181/2022).

The Patras Single-Member Court of Appeal rejected, with decision 121/2019, the Greek State's appeal against a first-instance decision ordering it to pay the plaintiff a total amount of €7,830.52 plus legal interest, to compensate for material damage and moral harm suffered as a result of a traffic accident caused by a Greek Police service vehicle, the driver of which was found to be solely responsible for the accident. In particular, according to Article 105 of the Introductory Law to the Civil Code, "for unlawful acts or omissions of public authorities in the exercise of the public authority entrusted to them, the state is liable for compensation, unless the act or omission was in violation of a provision that exists for the sake of the general interest. The person responsible shall be jointly and severally liable with the State, subject to the special provisions on the liability of ministers." The above liability of the Hellenic Republic is full, meaning that it covers both the actual damage and the loss of profits suffered by the injured administered party. In addition, by analogous application of Article 932 of the Greek Civil Code, monetary compensation for non-pecuniary (moral) damage suffered by the injured party may also be awarded. Such compensation is assessed solely in relation to the injured party himself or herself and not with regard to any relatives who may have suffered so-called “reflective” damage. Moreover, proof of fault on the part of the administrative organ whose unlawful act caused the damage to the administered party is not required; it suffices to establish the existence of an unlawful act or omission in the exercise of public authority and the causal link between that act or omission and the damage incurred. In the present case, the claimant, while driving her vehicle in full compliance with the law, wearing her seat belt and having a green traffic light on the lane in which she was travelling, collided at an intersection with a service vehicle of the Hellenic Police, which was travelling on the intersecting road. The said service vehicle entered the intersection despite the fact that the traffic light on its lane showed a red signal, a circumstance that resulted in the subsequent collision with the claimant’s vehicle. The police vehicle therefore acted unlawfully, in breach of the relevant provisions of the Road Traffic Code, conduct which causally led to the harmful event, namely the collision of the two vehicles and the ensuing injury of the claimant. The defendant Hellenic Republic raised, at first instance, a plea of contributory negligence on the part of the claimant in relation to the traffic accident; however, this plea was rejected on the basis of the above reasoning. The finding of exclusive liability of the Hellenic Republic was confirmed by the appellate court. The collision at issue resulted in the claimant’s inability to work for a period of approximately one and a half months due to the injuries she sustained and, consequently, in the loss of the income corresponding to that period (loss of profits). These amounts were awarded to her by the court of first instance, after deduction of the sum paid to the claimant by the competent social insurance bodies as sickness benefit. Furthermore, by analogous application of Article 932 of the Greek Civil Code, the claimant was awarded monetary compensation in the amount of €2,000 for the restoration of the moral damage she suffered as a result of the bodily injuries caused by the accident, as well as the subsequent lengthy rehabilitation process to which she was subjected following her discharge from hospital. In determining the amount of such compensation, the court took into account the circumstances under which the harmful event occurred, the age of the injured party, her financial situation, and the nature, extent, and severity of the injury. By contrast, and according to the court’s reasoning, the financial situation of the defendant Hellenic Republic does not in any way, either positively or negatively, affect the calculation of the amount of monetary compensation due. The appellate court concurred with the above findings concerning both the award of compensation for the damage suffered and the monetary compensation for the moral damage sustained by the claimant. Consequently, the appeal lodged by the Hellenic Republic was dismissed in its entirety, thereby confirming the injured party’s claim for compensation and moral damages arising from the traffic accident caused by a service vehicle of the Hellenic Police.