In the event of the death of their child in a road traffic accident, the parents may claim compensation either for deprivation of maintenance or for deprivation of the child’s services, provided that appropriate legal arguments and substantiation are presented.
According to Greek law, a child who belongs to the household of their parents and is raised or maintained by them is obliged to provide services to their parents for the management of the household or the exercise of their profession, in proportion to the child’s abilities and the living conditions of both the child and the family. Consequently, in the event of the death of the child, the parents may claim compensation either for deprivation of maintenance or for deprivation of services. These rights of the parents are in a relationship of alternativity rather than cumulativeness, meaning that they may choose one of the two claims (see Ath. Kritikos, Compensation from Road Traffic Accidents, 1998 edition, para. 409 et seq.). It is for the parents to decide which of the two claims they will pursue. Furthermore, it is accepted that the obligation of the child to provide services is autonomous and is not dependent on a reciprocal relationship with the parents’ obligation to provide maintenance.
A prerequisite for the existence of this obligation of the child is their status as a member of the parents’ household, which is, as a rule, linked to cohabitation. According to the prevailing view, the age of the child is not decisive, nor whether the child is married or unmarried, nor is it examined whether, at the time of death, the child was actually providing services or had done so in the past. For the establishment of the parents’ right, it suffices that the obligation of the child to provide services would have arisen in the near future in the ordinary course of events and that the damage suffered by the parents can already be determined.
However, if the parents’ damage is not merely future but depends on uncertain and unpredictable factors—such as the parents’ life expectancy, the child’s capacity to provide services, or the child’s departure from the parental home—which may or may not occur in the future, no claim for compensation arises. This is particularly the case where the child was of a very young age at the time of death, making it more difficult to determine these elements with certainty due to the relatively long period that would have had to elapse before the child became capable of providing services.
Given, however, that children over the age of fourteen (14) have an objective capacity to provide services, the obligation under this provision has practical application mainly in cases involving children over that age (see Athens Court of Appeal 308/2000). Consequently, the death of a child aged ten (10), who was a member of the parental household, does not establish a claim for compensation by the parent against a third party under Article 928 of the Civil Code, as no compensable damage exists due to the child’s objective and actual inability, by reason of age, to provide services capable of monetary valuation.
It is true that, according to the prevailing view, it is not necessary that the child was actually providing services to the parent at the time of death; it suffices that, in the ordinary course of events, the child’s obligation to provide services to the parent would have arisen in the near future. Nevertheless, in the statement of claim for compensation against a third party, the type and extent of the services that the child would have provided must be set out, so that it can be assessed whether such services would have been proportionate to the child’s abilities and living conditions and thus capable of being valued in monetary terms (Ath. Kritikos, Compensation from Road Traffic Accidents, 3rd ed., 1998, paras. 416, 417, 513, 518).
In any event, parents may not claim compensation for deprivation of services under Article 1508 of the Civil Code if the minor child was professionally employed outside the household and was essentially self-supported through their own income contributed to the parents’ family, since in such a case one of the basic conditions of Article 1508 of the Civil Code is not met (Athens Court of Appeal 10116/1988, Hellenic Justice Review 1990, vol. 31, p. 865).
Furthermore, where the provision of services by the child to the parents is based on a contract (e.g. an employment contract), the parents have no claim for compensation against a third party (Ath. Kritikos, op. cit., para. 412, p. 159; Athens Court of Appeal 6614/1992). A contractual employment relationship also exists where the child cooperates in the parents’ business to an extent exceeding the scope of ordinary family-law services, resembling an employment relationship governed by labor law, where the child is subject to the employer’s managerial authority and receives remuneration for their work. The stability and amount of remuneration are relevant to determining the nature of the relationship (Ath. Kritikos, op. cit., para. 412, p. 159; Athens Court of Appeal 1571/2000).
Finally, from Article 216 §1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in conjunction with Articles 914, 928 para. (b), and 1508 of the Civil Code, it follows that, for the statement of claim to be sufficiently specific in an action brought by the parents of a deceased child seeking compensation from the liable party for deprivation of the child’s services, it is sufficient to state that the child was a member of the parents’ household and was maintained by them, as well as to specify the type and extent of the services provided. This enables the court to assess whether those services were proportionate to the child’s abilities and living conditions and to determine their monetary value (Ath. Kritikos, op. cit., paras. 416, 417, 513, 518; see also Supreme Court Decisions 303/2005 and 505/1999; Athens Court of Appeal 308/2000; Larissa Court of Appeal 49/2002).
